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A Prolegomena to Reviving the Civil Rights Act of
1066: White Standing Under Section 1981-A
Federal Common Law Right to Contract
ALLEN E. SHOENBERGER*
INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the passage of
the fourteenth amendment, courts have made some fundamental
errors in interpretation of both, largely because of a failure to distin-
guish adequately two very different questions. Courts have confused
who has a right under either the Act or the amendment with the
scope of those rights.' The result has led to such anomalies as asser-
tions that only blacks were protected under both. This article fo-
cuses on the 1866 Civil Rights Act and its misinterpretations, partic-
ularly as to the scope of persons covered. The argument will con-
clude that whites as well as blacks (and for certain rights, aliens)
are covered. The result is that for certain limited rights, particularly
the rights of contract, the 1866 Civil Rights Act constitutes a species
of equal protection law that protects some sort of federal contractual
rights in and among the states. Unlike the fourteenth amendment,
which insures that the rights a state makes available to its citizens
generally are available to all residents but guarantees nothing in the
way of minimal rights, the 1866 Civil Rights Act does for some
purposes constitute a floor of rights. One example would be that
whites who move to white suburbs and purchase houses at inflated
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. J.D., 1969,
Columbia Law School; LL.M., 1972, New York University School of Law. International Legal
Center Fellow, 1969-1971; Ford Urban Law Fellow, 1971-1972; National Science Foundation
Fellow, 1972.
The author would like to express his thanks to Ms. Susan Payne Mullendore for her
research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Legislative and judicial confusion about the entire period may to some extent be traced
to the assumptions of the drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the post-Civil War
constitutional amendments. Jacobus tenBroek concludes his examination of 1837 debates
over the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia:
The meaning of the equal protection requirement which eighty years of Supreme
Court decisions has made primary, namely, that it enjoins improper classification,
never occurred to the abolitionists in this debate. The failure of protection, the
unequal protection in the case of slavery, was so gross that refinements of this sort
were irrelevant.
J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 54 (1965) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL UNDER LAW]. The
judicial and legislative refinements superimposed upon the period tend to obscure the fact
that the collective effort was to secure simple justice.
Loyola University Law Journal
prices because of the "artificial racial character" of the suburb
might have causes of action against various parties for the damages
caused. A buyer might, for example, allege that a consortium of
banks in their willingness to make loans in white suburbs only had
made money overly available, artifically inflating the market prices.
The banks are liable for such artificial inflation.
If sound, that conclusion is startling enough, but the argument
goes further. The initial assumption that the 1866 Civil Rights Act
pertained only to discrimination on the basis of race should be reex-
amined; it is possible that other sorts of discrimination by private
parties may be reached.' Acceptance of that argument would lead
to substantial federalization of areas of private law that up to now
had purportedly been subject to state law, except insofar as Con-
gress specifically acted under its other powers such as the commerce
power.
Only after jurisdiction is settled under the 1866 Civil Rights Act
does the real job of federal courts begin, the job of delimiting the
scope of that "new" area of federal law. The suggestion is that
discrimination by private parties made on the basis of articulated
reasons (or in the context of situations that are tantamount to the
same) when these reasons are contrary to national policy, gives rise
to a cause of action under the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Courts might
conclude, for example, that the firing of an employee because of the
exercise of his free speech rights by a private employer is actionable.
In the context of the case that touched off this entire analysis, some
attempt will be made to suggest the sorts of analysis that courts
could undertake to resolve such questions. However, even if courts
reject the argument that discrimination based on grounds beyond
race (and alienage) is actionable under the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
the duty still remains upon federal courts to perform similar analy-
sis to delimit the scope of the federal rights under the Act. This last
term the Supreme Court decided McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co.' and in doing so held squarely for the first time
that both the 1866 Civil Rights Act4 as well as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19645 protects whites against discrimination
on the basis of race when contracting for employment with a
private employer. In McDonald, three employees of the Santa Fe
were accused of misappropriating 60 one-gallon cans of anti-freeze,
2. The state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the 1866
Civil Rights Act, since it was passed under the authority of the thirteenth amendment.
3. 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
4. 14 Stat. 27, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
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part of a Santa Fe rail shipment. Within a week the two white
employees were fired while the black employee was retained. Noth-
ing suggested any difference in guilt on the part of the employees,,
nor did Santa Fe claim that the different treatment was part of an
affirmative action program.7 The white employees first lodged a
grievance pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement, and
when that produced no relief brought suit in federal district court.
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit held the petitioners
lacked standing under § 1981 and no cause of action had been
stated under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since there was no
allegation that the plaintiffs were falsely charged.' These decisions
were reversed by the Supreme Court. However, given the posture
of the case, none of the claims were decided on the merits; the
holding of lack of standing under § 1981 and the failure to state a
claim under Title VII precluded any decision on the merits. This
article focuses primarily on the implications and ramifications of
standing under § 1981 for white persons. It will, however, attempt
to provide some suggestions toward the resolution of the substantive
issue.
THE STANDING ISSUE
The Supreme Court held in McDonald that a district court has
jurisdiction to entertain an action brought pursuant to § 1981 by a
white person.' Section 1981 states:
6. This appears to have been the posture at the district court level as well as in the Fifth
Circuit. However, in the briefs to the Supreme Court much was made of a statement by
McDonald that he "did not steel [sic] anything." Brief for McDonald at 5 nn.7-8, McDonald
v. Santa Fa Trail Trans. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
7. 96 S. Ct. at 2578.
8. Id. at 2576-77.
9. The treatment by various courts of the § 1981 standing claims has been erratic. Several
courts have held or suggested that § 1981 does not protect non-black plaintiffs. See Jones v.
United Gas Improvement Corp., 12 FEP Cases 351 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses
Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829
(N.D. Cal. 1973); cf. Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 285 F.2d
426 (4th Cir. 1960); Marshall v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union 60, 343 F. Supp. 70
(E.D. La. 1972). A number of these cases have suggested or held that aliens are not covered.
See Kurylas v. Department of Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 1072 (D.D.C. 1974)(non-coverage of
national origin cases). Discrimination based on sex is not covered. Fitzgerald v. United
Methodist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Il1. 1972); Williams v. San Francisco
Unified School District, 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Harris v. National Tea Co., 4
E.P.D. 7595 (N.D. Ill.), affd on other grounds, 454 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1971); Abshire v.
Chicago & Eastern Ry. Co., 352 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Only discrimination based upon
race is coverable. See, e.g., Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1957). See also
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (regarding a § 1982 action).
Other cases have held that whites have a right to sue. Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240
(E.D. Mo. 1969); Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894
Loyola University Law Journal
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions
of every kind, and to no other."0
Respondents contended in McDonald that the phrase "as is enjoyed
by white citizens" as well as the statutory history limits the applica-
tion of § 1981 to non-white persons." The Supreme Court rejected
the mechanical reading of the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens" to limit the application of § 1981. Justice Marshall wrote for
the court:
[T]he statute explicitly applies to "all persons" (emphasis
added), including white persons. See, e.g. United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675-676 (1898). While a mechanical read-
ing of the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" would seem to
lend support to respondents' reading of the statute, we have pre-
viously described this phrase simply as emphasizing "the racial
character of the rights being protected." Georgia v. Rachel, 384
U.S. 780, 791 (1966). In any event, whatever ambiguity there may
be in the language of section 1981 . . .is clarified by an examina-
tion of the legislative history of § 1981's language as it was origi-
nally forged in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.11
The Mechanical Reading of the Face of the Statute
In McDonald, the lower courts held," in effect, that the statute
protected non-whites by assimilating them to the "preferred status
(E.D. Mo. 1969), WRMA Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Ala.
1973); Walker v. Painter, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969)(white plaintiffs evicted because
of black guests); cf. Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1975)(white husband and black
wife of interracial couple); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak, 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975)(white
forced into early retirement because he sold his house to a black); Guerra v. Manchester
Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974);
Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975); see Commonwealth of
Kentucky v. Powers, 139 F. 452 (E.D. Ky. 1905).
Federal District Judge Oliver Carter in Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp. confessed that the
cases conflict and distinguished Central Presbyterian Church and Gannon v. Action on
grounds that property rights were involved (i.e., § 1982) and suggested that he could not
change the law until the Supreme Court settles the issue. 368 F. Supp. at 840 n.8. He also
noted that the Trafficante decision specifically reserved the issue. 409 U.S. at 209 n.8 (1972).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)(emphasis added).
11. 96 S. Ct. at 2581.
12. Id.
13. Judge Bue reversed himself in a subsequent case decided after McDonald had been
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, but before the Supreme Court decided McDonald. Spiess v. C.
Itoh & Co., 408 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
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of white citizens." The words "the same rights . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens" serves to establish the standard against which the
rights of all others (i.e. non-white citizens) will be measured.
Another possible mechanical approach would be to shift emphasis
from the word "white" to the word "citizens." The sentence would
then read, "All persons shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed
by white citizens." The word "white" becomes incidental, and the
standard against which the rights of all persons would be measured
would be those rights enjoyed by citizens.
The problem with both readings, and the reason in part that the
Supreme Court rejected them, is that they assume mutually exclu-
sive categories, or at least a situation in which either category (ei-
ther "white citizens" or "white citizens") defines a class of persons
with certain rights that are being enlarged as a class by the force of
the statute. Thus, no white citizen received any rights under the
statute.
Instead, the Supreme Court adopted its own version of a mechani-
cal test by reading the words "white citizens" to limit the applica-
tion of § 1981 to discrimination based upon race.' 4 The Court's
citation to Georgia v. Rachel"5 is to a page that includes the critical
sentence: "That phrase ['as is enjoyed by white citizens'] was later
added in committee in the House, apparently. to emphasize the
racial character of the rights being protected."' 6
The statutory history of § 1981 is anything but clear, but there is
one interpretation of the language that yields a different result.
Insofar as there is a standard of rights being conferred by the stat-
ute, that standard is the "right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens."
"White citizens" describes the scope of the rights conferred under
the statute, not the persons who receive those rights. The crucial
language under this interpretation would be, "all persons shall have
the same right." This interpretation assumes that the drafters of the
1866 Act intended to confer upon all free men the broadest class of
rights possible, and those were clearly the rights enjoyed by the
most preferred group, white citizens. Using this analysis, the racial
nature of the rights would become unimportant, for the proper inter-
pretation of the statute would be, "all persons shall have the same
rights as are enjoyed by the best of our citizens." Only examination
of the statutory history sheds light on this problem.
14. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
15. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
16. Id. at 791.
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The Statutory History of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
One of the most heated debates about legislative history in recent
times was touched off by the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. 11 dealing with a sister statute to § 1981. Jones
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibited all racial discrimination,
public or private, in the sale or rental of real estate. The court so
held even though the Civil Rights Act of 196818 contained a fair
housing title 9 that substantially expanded the federal commit-
ment to open housing for blacks, and even though the decision effec-
tively "extended the coverage of federal 'fair housing' laws far be-
yond that which Congress in its wisdom chose to provide in the Civil
Rights Act of 1968."20
That debate was revived last term in the Supreme Court's opinion
in Runyon v. McCrary2' which held that § 1981 prohibits private
schools from excluding qualified children solely because they are
Negroes. Two justices dissented, Justices White and Rehnquist, and
another two justices concurred, Justices Powell and Stevens. Both
concurred primarily on grounds of stare decisis. Justice Stevens in
his concurring opinion posed the problem as, "whether to follow a
line of authority which I firmly believe to have been incorrectly
decided. '2 2 Justice Powell indicated that much of Justice White's
dissenting opinion is "persuasive" and that he might be inclined to
agree with him, but that it comes too late. 23 On balance, the Su-
preme Court most likely erred in interpreting the legislative history
to require the result reached in Jones.2 However, this conclusion
suggests the inherent difficulty of interpreting the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The debate is summarized by Justice White in Runyon v.
McCrary:
[T]he legislative history of . . . § 1981 confirms that the statute
means what it says and no more, i.e., that it outlaws any legal rule
disabling any person from making or enforcing a contract, but does
not prohibit private racially motivated refusals to contract. 25
17. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
18. Pub. Law 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
19. Pub. Law 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, § 801 et seq. (1968).
20. 392 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
22. Id. at 2603.
23. Id. at 2601-02.
24. See I. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION: 1864-1888 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
FAIRMAN]. Compare, Book Review, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 461 (1974). See also Clio, Bemused and
Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 89; Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come
Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969).
25. 96 S. Ct. at 2606.
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That dispute, however, turned more on the content of the rights
protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 than what persons have
rights under the Act. Although Justices White and Rehnquist also
dissented in McDonald, they did so on the grounds asserted in
Runyon v. McCrary, that § 1981 does not cover private activity.26
A fair reading of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act dem-
onstrates conclusively that whites are within the scope of persons
protected by the statute.
A. Legislative History of the White Citizen Language
Amidst all of the confusion in the legislative history, some things
are completely clear, particularly that the class of intended benefi-
ciaries of the 1866 statute included blacks. Indeed, some critics of
the bill in Congress maintained that the Congress neither could nor
should do what it purported to do in the initial drafts of the bill:
make the black man a citizen.
It is a white man's Government. I say the Negro is not a citizen.
He may be made a citizen by power, but it will be in disregard, I
think, of principle. I deny that this is a government of amalgama-
tion.7
The principal discussion of the classes of beneficiaries turned
around not blacks, who were clearly in, or whites, who were rarely
mentioned, but other special classes of persons, particularly Indi-
ans, foreigners and other minority groups. The tone of the debate is
reflected in a speech by Senator Davis, a staunch opponent of the
bill:
I say it [the Constitution] ignored the black man: it paid no
attention to him; it was made by a different race of beings; it did
not comprehend him; he had nothing to do with it any more than
the Indian of the forest had, any more than the Chinaman in
California had in the foundation of the constitution of that State.,
Treatment of white citizens as a class is obscure largely because
of the overwhelming preoccupation of congressmen with the "ever-
lasting, inevitable Negro." 9 Otherwise, three fundamental ques-
tions preoccupied Congress: first, the power of Congress to confer
26. Id. at 2586.
27. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 528 (1866) (remarks of Senator Davis). The pas-
sage of the fourteenth amendment making "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside," was largely in response to such doubts. Id.
28. Id.
29. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 470 (1866).
19761
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citizenship upon blacks under the thirteenth amendment;3 second,
the scope of "civil rights" in the absence of any definition in
the first version of the bill; third, the inter-relationship between
federal and state power in the area of enforcement. In effect, the
discussion suggested grafting federal rights on the states through the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In light of the debates
in Congress in 1866, Jacobus tenBroek has characterized this con-
troversy as one concerning national citizenship.3'
Only when the debates reach the general issue of equality are they
useful for extrapolating the treatment of the white citizen in the
statute. For example, in an earlier draft of the bill which did not
contain any limitation on the definition of civil rights, the question
did arise as to who the bill would protect. In the Senate, it was
suggested that:
. . . It is not confined to persons of African descent. . . that is to
say, that no state shall discriminate at all between any inhabitants
within her limits on account of any race to which they may belong,
white or black, on account of color, if they are previously in the
state of slavery, so that the white as well as the black is included
in this first section . . . 32
Two days later, Senator Davis, in the context of his argument that
state power was being usurped unconstitutionally, commented that
the bill provides all inhabitants of every race and color the enumer-
ated rights. 33 He considered this outrageous from the point of view
30. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
31. EQUAL UNDER LAW, supra note 1, passim.
32. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (remarks of Senator Johnson)(emphasis
added). This speech is an interpretation of the first section of the bill as originally submitted.
Initially, the first clause read: "That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immun-
ities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of race,
color, or previous condition of slavery." That was later dropped, largely because of the prob-
lem inherent in defining civil rights. This clause was striken by the House of Representatives
prior to its passage of the bill on March 13, 1866. Representative Wilson accepted the amend-
ment commenting, "I do not think it materially changes the bill .. " CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1866). There is no indication that the deleted portion of the bill was
intended to alter the scope of its coverage. For example, see the discussion by Representative
Bingham (later a prime mover in the passage of the fourteenth amendment): "Can Congress
declare no discrimination in civil rights in any state on account of race? What are civil
rights?" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1267 (1866). See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1290 (1866)(remarks of Rep. Schellaburger).
It has been found impossible to settle or define what are all the indispensable rights
of American Citizenship. But it is perfectly well settled what are some of these . ..
the right of petition and the right of protection in such property as is lawful for that
particular citizen to hold.
Id.
33. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 598-99 (1866).
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of states' rights. Senator Trumbull's response to this provides one
of the most succinct statements of the entire debate on the question
of who is protected. His statement was made in a spirit of sarcasm,
punctuated by the laughter of his collegues:
He (Davis) denounces this bill as "outrageous," "monstrous,"
"abominable," "oppressive," "iniquitous," "unconstitutional,"
"void."
• ..It is a bill providing that all people shall have equal rights. Is
not that abominable? Is not that iniquitous? Is not that most mon-
strous? Is not that terrible on white men? (Laughter) When was
such legislation as this ever thought of for white men?
Sir, this bill applies to white men as well as black men. It de-
clares that all persons in the United States shall be entitled to the
same civil rights, the right to the fruit of their own labor, the right
to make contracts, the right to buy and sell, and enjoy liberty and
happiness: and that is abominable and iniquitious and unconstitu-
tional! Could anything be more monstrous or more abominable
than for a member of the Senate to rise in his place and denounce
with such epithets as these a bill, the only object of which is to
secure equal rights to all citizens of the country, a bill that protects
a white man just as much as a black man? With what consistency
and with what face can a Senator in his place here say to the
Senate and the country that this is a bill for the benefit of black
men exclusively when the very object of the bill is to break down
all discrimination between black men and white men?4
Although Senator Trumbull was somewhat carried away by his
own rhetorical flourish, the substance is quite clear. Whites were so
obviously never to have fewer rights than blacks, that the suggestion
of the opposite was ludicrous. The bill then written protected whites
as well as blacks.
Had the text of the bill remained unchanged there would have
been no problem. However, the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens" was not added until a month later. Representative Wilson, the
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and House Floor Manager,
suggested the addition on March 1.31 In that context, however, Mr.
Wilson said:
Mr. Speaker, if all our citizens were of one race and one color we
should be relieved of most of the difficulties which surround us.
34. Id. at 599. Justice Marshall quoted the last paragraph of this passage. 96 S. Ct. at
2583. See also 96 S. Ct. at 2582 n.19. Section 4 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act protects "all
persons in their constitutional rights of equality before the law, without distinction of race or
color." Id.
35. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866).
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This bill would be almost, if not entirely, unnecessary, and if the
States, seeing that we have citizens of different races and colors,
would but shut their eyes to these differences and legislate, so far
at least as regards to civil rights and immunities, as though all
citizens were of one race and color, our troubles as a nation would
be well-nigh over. But such is not the case, as we must do as best
we can to protect our citizens, from the highest to the lowest, from
the whitest to the blackest, in the enjoyment of the great funda-
mental rights which belong to all men.
3 1
At the minimum, Representative Wilson intended that equal
treatment be accorded the various races.
Justice Marshall in McDonald noted that the bill was routinely
viewed by opponents and supporters alike as applying to the civil
rights of whites as well as non-whites. 7 Moreover, he noted that the
respondents had been unable to find any congressional debate from
any stage of the bill that contradicts the plain language of Senator
Trumbull, and others, that anti-white discrimination was also pro-
hibited by the bill.1 The amendment by Congressman Wilson was
a technical amendment to perfect the bill which was accepted with-
out objection or debate. 9 When this amendment was discussed on
the floor of the Senate, some suggested that it was superfluous. 0
Senator Trumbull responded and, in essence, agreed:
Senator Van Winkle: There seems to be an incongruity in this
language . . . This clause commences with the words "and such
citizens." As I understand those words, they include all persons
who are or can be citizens, white persons and all others. The clause
then goes on to provide that "such citizens of every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts
. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." It seems to me these words
are superfluous. The idea is that the rights of all persons shall be
36. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
37. 96 S. Ct. at 2582.
38. Id. at 2582-83 n.20. Justice Marshall stated:
[11n later dialogue Wilson made quite clear that the purpose of his amendment
was not to affect the act's protection of white persons. Rather he stated, "the reason
for offering [the amendment] was this: it was thought by some persons that unless
these qualifying words were incorporated in the bill, those rights might be extended
to all citizens, whether male or female, majors or minors." Cong. Globe, House
App., 157. Thus the purpose of the amendment was simply "to emphasize the racial
character of the rights being protected," Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 791, not to
limit its application to non-white persons.
96 S. Ct. at 2584.
39. 96 S. Ct. at 2583, citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866).
40. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1413 (1866).
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equal; and I think the clause, leaving out these words, would attain
the object. . . . I think the bill is incongruous in expression as it
stands.
Trumbull: I quite agree with the Senator from West Virginia that
these words are superfluous. I do not think they alter the bill. I
think the bill would be better without them, but they have been
adopted by the House of Representatives. We did not think they
altered the meaning of the bill; and we did not think it worthwhile
to send the bill back just because these words were inserted by the
House . . . . They thought there was some importance in them
and have inserted them: and as in the opinion of the committee
they did not alter the meaning of the bill, the committee thought
proper to recommend a concurrence, and I hope the Senate will
concur in it.4
B. Protecting Whites in the South
Much of that argument is, however, negative argument. The
amendment did not change anything, because no one said it did.
The bill protected whites because no one said it did not.
There is, however, an even stronger argument that the intention
was to protect white as well as black citizens. That relates to consid-
erations of the white man in the South during Reconstruction. Not
only were there "carpetbaggers," but also whites who had remained
loyal to the North. One week later, Representative Broomall com-
mented:
I nevertheless maintain and hold myself ready to prove that white
men, citizens of the United States, have been, and are now being
punished under color of State law for refusing to commit treason
against the United States at the bidding of Democratic candidates
for the Presidency; that white men, soldiers of the Republic, have
been arraigned in state courts, under State laws, for the crime of
shooting down traitors on the field of battle by command of their
military superiors, and only saved from being hanged, on convic-
tion of murder, by the interposition of that branch of the military
forces of the Government known as the Freedman's Bureau. I
maintain further, that white men, citizens of the United States,
have been driven from their homes, and have had their lands con-
fiscated in State courts, under State law, for the crime of loyalty
to their country, and that now they are begging in vain for a redress
of wrongs in the courts of the reconstructed South.
41. Id., quoted in 96 S. Ct. at 2583 (emphasis added).
19761
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The people of the South were not all traitors. Among them were
knees that never bowed to the Baal of secession, lips that never
kissed his image. Among the fastnesses of the mountain in the
rural districts, far from the contagion of political centers, the fires
of patriotism still burned, sometimes in the higher walks of life,
oftener in obscure hamlets and still oftener under skins as black
as the hearts of those who claimed to own them.2
As Representative Moulton stated: "The Union men now are
being compelled to leave the rebel states to save their property and
lives."4" One of the reasons advanced by President Johnson in veto-
ing the bill was that "the distinction of race and color is, by the bill,
made to operate in favor of the colored and against the white race.",
That objection goes less to the particular issue here than to the issue
of congressional power to pass the bill at all.
Representative Wilson's response in the debate of March 8, 1866
undercuts most of the objections of this nature made by President
Johnson. The debate was whether Congress had the power to enable
Negroes to testify in state courts:
Mr. Niblack: If the gentleman will permit me, I will respond to the
gentleman from Iowa (Wilson). I ask whether under most of the
State laws the wife is not prohibited from testifying against the
husband, or vice versa? Now, would not his objection as well apply
to that?
Mr. Wilson of Iowa: It is not so in many of the State laws; but then
I answer the gentlemen in the language of the bill referred to by
the gentleman from Ohio. . . a few moments ago, these rights are
to be the same as are enjoyed by white citizens. 45
The real dispute concerned the scope of the rights to be granted,
not the person to whom they were granted. Those rights accorded
white citizens were to be accorded to all. The Supreme Court was
correct then, when it held in McDonald that, ". . . the Act was
meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the mak-
42. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263-65 (1866). See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1618 and passim (1866)(remarks of Rep. Moulton).
43. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1618 (1866). See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1627 (1866)(remarks of Rep. Buckland).
I have already said that the Government was bound to protect the rights of the loyal
white people and the loyal colored people of the south, for a government which
either cannot or will not protect those who sustain it, when in peril, is not worth
fighting for.
Id.
44. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1681 (1866) (veto message). In the same message
President Johnson asserted that the bill attempted to fix "a perfect equality of the black and
white races." Id. at 1679.
45. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866).
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ing or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race.""
On the other hand, Justice Marshall neglects the congressional his-
tory about the position of whites in the South when he asserts:
Unlikely as it might have appeared in 1866 that white citizens
would encounter substantial racial discrimination of the sort
proscribed under the Act, the statutory structure and legislative
history persuades us that the Thirty-ninth Congress was intent
upon establishing in the federal law a broader principle than would
have been necessary simply to meet the particular and immediate
plight of the newly freed Negro slaves.47
To illustrate how likely the unlikely is, the McDonald trial judge
overruled his own holding in a case decided after the Fifth Circuit's
affirmance of McDonald, but before its reversal by the Supreme
Court. In Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc.," Judge Bue held
that white plaintiffs have standing under § 1981. Spiess involved
white plaintiffs suing on behalf of themselves and all other non-
secretarial personnel of non-Japanese origin, who are, have been, or
might have been employed by a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japa-
nese corporation. Judge Bue, commented on President Johnson's
veto message:
Nevertheless, even he [President Johnson] recognized that the
real intention of the bill as to race discrimination was to provide
for the equal treatment of all races before the law: "Thus a perfect
equality of the white and black races is attempted to be fixed by
the Federal law., in every State of the Union, over the vast field of
State jurisdiction covered by these enumerated rights. In no one
of these can any State ever exercise any power of discrimination
between the different races." 9
Judge Bue concluded:
At most, therefore, this phrase constituted, in 1866, a comparative
instrument by which to measure the relative protection from
abridgment of enumerated civil rights on account of racial discrim-
ination to be accorded to all persons, including white citizens, in
exercise of rights then enjoyed solely by white citizens.9
In part, Judge Bue attributed his shift in position to the decision
by Judge Blumenfeld in Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck and Co."'
46. 96 S. Ct. at 2585.
47. Id. at 2585-86.
48. 12 FEP Cases 230 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
49. Id. at 235.
50. Id. at 236.
51. 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975).
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Judge Blumenfeld held that a white student stated a cause of action
under § 1981 when he alleged that the defendant refused to consider
him for a position in its Summer Internship Program for Minority
Students. Judge Blumenfeld concluded, "In light then, of this legis-
lative history, it is quite clear that § 1981 should not be read as only
providing a cause of action for non-whites. The phrase-'as is en-
joyed by white citizens'-was apparently intended only 'to empha-
size the racial character of the rights being protected.' "52
C. Court Treatment of Whites Under Section 1982
Prior to McDonald, the Supreme Court had recognized white
standing under § 1982 in a number of contexts, most importantly
in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. " The Supreme Court held,
inter alia, that a white person who was expelled from a recreation
association for the advocacy of a Negro's cause had standing be-
cause he suffered by his association with a cause designed to eradi-
cate the "badges and incidents" of slavery. 4
The holding in Sullivan was further extended in Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n.55 Tillman challenged an eligibil-
ity preference system at a private club. Preference was given to
home owners within a particular defined area. The black home
owner was clearly entitled to recovery, since "when an organization
links membership benefits to residency in a narrow geographical
area, that decision infuses those benefits into the bundle of rights
for which an individual pays when buying or leasing within the
area. '"5" There were also white plaintiffs in Tillman, Murray and
Rosalind Tillman, who had on one occasion invited Grace Rosner,
a black, as their guest. At a special meeting held the following day,
the board of directors changed the guest policy to limit guests to
relatives of the members. The Tillmans' claims, as well as Mrs.
Rosner's, were brought under both § 1982 and § 1981. The court
stressed the "historical interrelationship between section 1981 and
section 1982", and saw "no reason to construe these sections differ-
ently when applied, on these facts, to the claim of Wheaton-Haven
that it is a private club."5 Not only did the whites apparently have
standing under § 1981 as well as § 1982, but the holding strongly
suggested that the state action limitation" does not apply in § 1981
52. Id. at 94.
53. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
54. Indeed, his position was analogous to that of the whites in the post-bellum South.
55. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
56. Id. at 437.
57. Id. at 440.
58. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 8
White Standing Under Section 1981
actions. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. ," the Supreme
Court explicitly adopted that suggestion:
Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well settled
among the federal courts of appeals-and we now join them-that
§ 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private
employment on the basis of race.60
In each of these cases, however, the assumption has been that §
1981's scope extends to discrimination based on race."'
Is ONLY RACIAL DISCRIMINATION COVERED?
Curiously enough, the thirteenth amendment does not mention
race, although it does refer to "slavery or involuntary servitude."
The present version of § 1981, as well as § 1982, refers to race only
through the inclusion of the white citizen standard."2 Both sections
are amended codifications of the 1866 Civil Rights Act which pro-
vided in pertinent part:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, exluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to
be citizens of the United States; and such citizens of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or invol-
untary servitude . . . shall have the same rights enumerated...
as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 11
The 1866 Act was reenacted with slight alterations in 1870, as
section 16 of An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United
States to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other
Purposes which in relevant part provided:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory in the United
States . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens 64
Section 18 provided that:
The act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and furnish the means of their vindication, passed April
59. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
60. Id. at 460.
61. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968): "ITihe statute in
this case deals only with racial discrimination and does not address itself to discrimination
on grounds of religion or national origin."
62. See note 11 supra and accompanying text, and notes 46 through 52 supra and accom-
panying text.
63. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27.
64. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §16, 16 Stat. 144.
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nine, 1866, is hereby re-enacted; and sections 16 and 17 hereof shall
be enforced according to the provisions of said act.65
The principal change in the reenactment was the substitution of
"persons" for "citizens." This was, however, coupled with a deter-
mination that only some of the rights covered by the 1866 Civil
Rights Act were to be accorded to non-citizens. All of the property
rights contained in the 1866 Act, "to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property,""6 were not included
within the enumeration of section 16 rights. 7 This can be traced
directly to floor discussion indicating clearly that Congress intended
to extend to aliens all but the specific property rights of the 1866
Act. 8 Senator Stewart, the sponsor of the Bill that was eventually
passed, explained the text of an almost identical bill by stating:
This bill extends it to aliens, so that all persons who are in the
United States shall have the equal protection of our laws. It
extends the operation of the civil rights bill, which is well known
in the Senate and to the country, to all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States. 9
In response to questioning, Senator Stewart amplified this point:
Mr. Stewart: If the Senator will examine this bill in connection
with the original civil rights bill, he will see that it has no reference
to inheriting or holding real estate.
Mr. Pomeroy: That is what I was coming to.
Mr. Stewart: The civil rights bill had several other things apply-
ing to citizens of the United States. This simply extends to foreign-
ers, not citizens, the protection of our laws where the State laws,
deny them the equal civil rights enumerated in the first section.6
The 1870 changes had the effect of broadening the class of persons
protected, but narrowing the scope of rights protected by § 1981.
Section 1982 extends property rights only to citizens. Hence, there
is authority in the legislative history of § 1981 that the prohibited
65. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch.114, §18, 16 Stat. 144.
66. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
67. Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of 1874 was subsequently codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1970).
68. See text accompanying notes 69 through 75 infra.
69. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1536 (1870). Senator Stewart, commenting on
collateral problems in the voting rights area, stated:
Now while I am opposed to Asiatics being brought here, and will join any reasonable
legislation to prevent anybody from bringing them, yet we have got a treaty that
allows them to come to this county . . . .While they are here I say it is our duty
to protect them.
70. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1536 (1870).
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discrimination reaches beyond race to at least discrimination based
on alienage.7 '
Except for the white citizen's standard that persisted through the
vagaries of the reenactment process, the language referring to "citi-
zens of every race and color, without regard to any previous condi-
tion of slavery or involuntary servitude" disappeared. The signifi-
cance of this deletion depends upon whether the words had any
restrictive meaning in the first place. In the various civil rights bills,
these words did not specifically restrict the scope of the language to
protect persons who suffered specific injuries. The words may be
read as emphatic, i.e., all citizens (later persons), and particularly
ex-slaves, shall have the same rights as white citizens. Once again
the plight of the carpetbagger or the Northern sympathizer must be
recalled. Either could have been seriously affected by state actions
or private action in the South not because of their race, but because
of their sympathies, and both would have been fully protected with
respect to the basic rights enumerated in § 1981 and § 1982.
The judicial justification for the commonplace statement that §
1981 and § 1982 cover only racial discrimination is seldom more
than a superficial assumption. For example, one of the most de-
tailed treatments of the issue appears in Baca v. Butz7 which cites
at least five cases in a footnote. 74 Baca involved a suit by a Mexican-
American employee of the Soil Conservation Service against the
government on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.
The court first cited Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ," but Jones was
a § 1982 action which assumed that the racial limitation applied.
The next case cited, Georgia v. Rachel, 6 is predicated upon the
same misleading mechanical interpretation of the statutory history
that led to Judge Bue's first opinion in McDonald and his later
reconsideration:
[Als originally proposed in the Senate, §1 of the bill that became
the 1866 Act did not contain the phrase, "as is enjoyed by white
citizens." That phrase was later added in committee in the House,
apparently to emphasize the racial character of the rights being
protected."
71. Accord, Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp. 350 F. Supp. 529, 530-536 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Kohn, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969).
72. See text accompanying notes 42 through 45 supra.
73. 394 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.M. 1975).
74. Id. at 889.
75. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
76. 384 U.S. 780, (1966).
77. Id. at 791 (emphasis added). There is subsequent reference to the deletion of the broad
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Snowden v. Hughes,7 8 the next case relied upon as authoritative,
is clearly distinguishable not only on its facts, but also upon the
legal basis of the decision. Snowden concerned a claim by a candi-
date for nomination to the Illinois House that the Illinois Canvas
Board improperly refused to certify him as nominated for purposes
of getting onto the final ballot. Instead of going to state court, the
candidate brought suit in federal district court.79
Most of Chief Justice Stone's opinion for the Court dwells upon
the equal protection claim and the absence of any allegation of
discrimination necessary to raise an equal protection issue. How-
ever, Justice Frankfurter, in a separate concurrence, summed up the
basis of the decision: "All questions pertaining to the political ar-
rangements of state governments are, no doubt, peculiarly outside
the domain of federal authority."' " Nothing could be further from
the truth today. Even then, a dissenting Justice Douglas suggested
that the petitioner ought to be given an opportunity to prove the
fact of discrimination, whatever the basis, for purposes of the equal
protection claim under the fourteenth amendment. Justice Frank-
furter treated the issue more as procedural than substantive. "A
different problem is presented when a case comes here on review
from a decision of a state court as the ultimate voice of state law."',
Moreover, large parts of the opinion by Justice Stone for the Court
are predicated upon the view of the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments which emerged from the Slaughterhouse Cases,2 par-
ticularly the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This view minimized the impact of the thirteenth
amendment and its subsidiary legislation. In substantial part, the
decision in Jones v. Mayer undercuts this analysis. Also, it seems
clear that the petitioner in Snowden never argued that the limita-
tion to racial discrimination should be curtailed, and again the
Court never seriously considered the issue.
enumeration of rights in the original section 1. It appears that this elimination was more the
result of concern with the nature of the rights to be included than with the racial nature of
the rights or persons to be protected. See FAIRMAN, supra note 24, at 1172 and passim. "The
bill simply gives to persons who are of different races or colors the same civil rights ...
That's its full extent; it goes no further." Id. at 1180 (remark of Senator Howard of Michigan).
However, part of the context of that speech is whether one race's rights could be greater than
another as well as the definition of the rights.
Georgia v. Rachel concerned the removal jurisdiction of federal courts under 28 U.S.C.
§1443 (1970).
78. 321 U.S. 1 (1943).
79. This case arose long before the extensive intervention in state elections touched off
by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
80. 321 U.S. at 14-15.
81. Id. at 17.
82. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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In Hague v. C.I.O.,83 the Court stated: "[Tihe major purpose of
. . [the Civil rights Act of 1866] was to secure to the recently
freed negroes all the civil rights secured to white men." 8, That is the
very problem at issue, and even there the Court only said "major."
Lastly, the district court in the Baca v. Butz opinion cited
Buchanan v. Warley,5 which not only failed to reach the issue, but
arguably hints at an opposite conclusion and confers upon a white
plaintiff a right based upon the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Buchanan"5
involved a contract for the sale of real estate between a white seller
and a black buyer. The black refused to perform, and raised as a
defense in a suit for specific performance the state law that prohib-
ited a black or white from moving onto a block that was already
occupied by a majority of the other race. The irony of the defense
was further heightened by the black defendant's reliance on Plessy
v. Ferquson.7 By prohibiting the use of such a defense, the effect of
the decision was to benefit the white seller. To be sure, Buchanan
does involve racial discrimination on the part of the state. Unlike
the Slaughterhouse aside by Justice Miller,88 Justice Day in
Buchanan notes: "While a principle purpose of the [Fourteenth
Amendment] . . . was to protect persons of color, the broad lan-
guage used was deemed sufficient to protect all persons, white or
black, against discriminatory legislation by the States." ' The
Buchanan Court never considered why all discriminations, whether
racially based or not, should not be protected by the 1866 Civil
Rights Act. The analysis of the Buchanan Court with respect to the
fourteenth amendment would then mean "All persons shall have the
same rights to make contracts. . . ." The substantive basis for
discrimination is irrelevant, only justifiable discrimination or differ-
ences are permissible. This would have the effect of substantially
converting the 1866 Civil Rights Act into an enforcement statute
tantamount in many cases to defining the content of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause. Moreover, since these federal
"substantive" equal protection rights would exist in a federal stat-
83. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
84. Id. at 509.
85. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
86. Id.
87. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
88. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81: "We doubt very much whether any action of a state not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be heard to come within the purview of this provision."
89. 245 U.S. at 76.
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ute, they would also be applicable to the particular state, and from
state to state.
In view of the hesitancy of the judiciary to deal with the issue in
any great detail, what support is there for the proposition that the
discriminatory practices which prompted § 1981 are not limited
solely to those based on race? Three principal points of argument
may be advanced. First, frequent and consistent rejection in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 debates that blacks were being given special
advantages suggest that race was not the central issue; it was equal-
ity of treatment. Second, there were references in the debates to
discriminations beyond race, particularly regarding political views.
Third, there is a "higher law background" in both the fourteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This argument is
particularly effective with respect to the Civil Rights Act because
of the presumption by some of the participants in Congress that
they were acting in the context of such rights.
Congressional History
Equal treatment was the presumed basis for congressional de-
bate. Throughout the congressional debates, charges were made
that various provisions in the enforcement statutes were particu-
larly advantageous to freed negroes to the exclusion of whites. Time
and again such charges were refuted:
Rep. Cox: This bill discriminates in favor of the black and against
the white.
If you turn to section five of the bill you will see that it allows
hinderance, control, and intimidation of a white voter; but it
makes it a crime to hinder, control, or intimidate a black citi-
zen...
Representative Bingham later responded to this allegation:
Gentlemen seem to intimate that this bill protects the elective
franchise only in citizens of color, as they are called; they intimate
that the equal right of the citizen of the United States to vote,
having like qualifications under the laws of the several states, is
not protected by it from disfranchisement on account of race! Sir,
men will look in vain for a single utterance from any gentlemen
who puts forth this unconsidered denunciation of the bill for a
single reference to any line in it that justifies their denunciation. 0
90. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3883 (1870).
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The subject of discussion was part of the text of the 1870 enforce-
ment bill that contained section 16, later § 1981. Section 5 read in
pertinent part:
That if any person shall prevent, hinder, control, or intimidate
. . . any person from exercising or in exercising the right of suf-
frage to whom the right of suffrage is secured or guaranteed by the
fifteenth amendment to the Constitution . . . shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . 1
This text is substantially the same as section 16, with the exception
of the white citizen standard. Yet, Representative Bingham clearly
thought that it protected whites as well as freed men. He does refer
to disenfranchisement on account of race. However, this is entirely
consistent since this part of the bill was an attempt to enforce the
fifteenth amendment, the only amendment that specifically is con-
fined to discrimination "on account of race, color or previous condi-
tion of servitude." Nevertheless, equality was the assumptive basis
for drafting and debate.
Congressmen were well aware that discriminatory activities in the
South might be directed against white, not only because of their
racial attitudes, but also because of their political tendencies. Sena-
tor Howe discussed a number of practices and statutes in the
South.92 A Mississippi statute included a provision that "all persons
usually associating with freed men . . ." could be fined. Senator
Howe asserted that:
under the provisions of [this statute] . . . every man on this floor
would be a criminal if in the State of Mississippi, because we do,
Mr. President - I am bound to make the confession - habitually
associate with a man of another color, a Senator on this floor.9"
Subsequently, Senator Howe went a step further and discussed the
attack by the notorious Yerger, of Ex parte Yerger" fame, on an
officer of the United States.
[Flor what? Not for any personal injury-Yerger had received
none at the hands of [the officer] . . . - but because they [Yerger
and others like him] hate Radicals. 5
91. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3689 (1870).
92. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2611 (1870).
93. Id.
94. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
95. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2611-12 (1870). But note that Yerger had in fact
been resisting the distraint of his wife's piano for unpaid taxes and in doing so killed a federal
official. FAIRMAN, supra note 24, at 564.
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Decisional Law
In addition to the legislative history, there is case authority that
suggests a similar conclusion. Kentucky v. Powers" dealt with an
allegation by a Republican that the juries had been constituted to
be selected solely from Democrats. While holding that removal of
such prosecutions to a federal court was permissible, the court dis-
cussed the application of the current version of § 1981:
But to say that it has reference thereto is not the same as to say
that it is limited thereto. . . .Section 1977 so far as it confers
rights, is not limited to negroes and colored persons. It confers
rights on white persons. The persons on whom it confers rights are
"all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." It is only
when it comes to define the rights which the section confers that
they are referred to as such "as is enjoyed by white citizens." 7
It is well to remember that the Civil War was not fought in the
first instance over slavery, but rather over issues of federalism. In
that context, it is critical to examine post-Civil War legislation with
an eye towards protecting "federal rights." For example, with re-
spect to the fourteenth amendment Jacobus tenBroek concludes:
The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to apply the Bill of
Rights to the states. The rights sought to be protected were men's
natural rights, some of which are mentioned in the first eight
amendments and some of which are not. Life, liberty and property,
substantively guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, were certainly such. The Fifth Amendment's proce-
dural guarantee of judicial process and jury trial like the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee of personal security and the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of speech, assembly, and religion, perhaps also
were. These had commonly been claimed as natural rights during
thirty years of abolitionist activity, but they were rarely mentioned
in the final stages of congressional history. To the extent that the
rights of the first eight amendments are natural rights, those
amendments were regarded as already being on the states. State
governments, like others were under a duty to protect such rights.
The Fourteenth Amendment confirmed that duty and imposed it
also on Congress. The rights of the Bill of Rights, however, which
are of a lesser order were not within its scope."
Not only is there a persuasive argument for the existence of certain
kinds of natural rights protected by the fourteenth amendment, but
96. 139 F. 452 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1905).
97. Id. at 495.
98. EQUAL UNDER LAW, supra note 1, at 238-39.
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as Louis Henkin recently observed after quoting parts of the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Virginia Declaration of Rights:
As the excerpts quoted above . . . suggest, our ancestors seem to
have had two different notions: "reserved" or retained rights, and
inalienable rights. Under the first conception, the people reserved
for themselves that which they did not wish to submit to the au-
thority of the government they created. Inalienable rights, cited in
the Declaration of Independence, were presumably "natural
rights" to which all are entitled under any form of government and
do not necessarily depend on the principle of popular sovereignty
... .(cite omitted) Reserved and natural rights, of course, come
together if one assumes that the people would not and could not
give away their natural rights, that they retained them because
they wished to or had to. Of course, the people could retain rights
in addition to their natural inalienable ones.
Presumably, these rights, retained or inalienable, are not necessar-
ily absolute but may be outweighed by a sufficient public good. Or,
perhaps, one can say that what is retained or inalienable are the
rights that are not outweighed by sufficient public good.9
It takes far less imagination to hold that certain rights associated
with the right to contract might be guaranteed through the § 1981
provision. '"'
Much of the debate demonstrates the failure on the part of the
fourteenth amendment's principal drafter, Representative
Bingham, to understand the holding of Barron v. Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore.0° That case held that the Bill of Rights was
inapplicable to the states. Bingham was of the opinion that the Bill
of Rights applied.102 He objected to the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
primarily because he believed that the federal government had no
power to enforce it, although the states were obliged to enforce it.903
99. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1413-14 (1974).
100. As well perhaps through another clause in the constitution that has been substan-
tially vitiated, the impairment of contract clause of article I, section 10.
101. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
102. But I feel that I am justified in saying, in view of the text of the Constitu-
tion of my country, in view of all its past interpretations, in view of the manifest
and declared intent of the men who framed it, the enforcement of the bill of rights,
touching the life, liberty and property of every citizen of the Republic within every
organized State of the Union, is of the reserved power of the States, to be enforced
by State tribunals and by State officials acting under the solemn obligations of an
oath imposed upon them by the Constitution of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866).
103. "You propose to make it a penal offense for the judges of the States to obey the
constitution and laws of their States, and for their obedience thereto to punish them by fine
and imprisonment as felons. I deny your power to do this. You cannot make an official act,
done under color of law, and without criminal intent and from a sense of public duty, a
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For years Bingham, and indeed, all Republican opponents of slav-
ery and of the Dred Scott decision, had assumed every important
constitutional right to be a privilege or immunity of citizens of the
United States. Such had been the basic premise and the theory of
the entire Amendment. 104
This provides, however, an explanation for the curious juxtaposi-
tion of the privileges and immunity clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and the fourteenth amendment's definition of citizenship.
During floor debate on the fourteenth amendment, the failure to
define citizenship in the proposed text was criticized. Representa-
tive Bingham failed to notice the inconsistency introduced in the
amendment by his inclusion of the first sentence: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States . . .are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside."
No one observed, apparently, that while citizenship was thus made
dual in the first sentence, only the privileges and immunities of
"Citizens of the United States" were specifically protected in the
second sentence against abridgment by the State. 0 5
This confusion was to have substantial and persisting impact in
the Slaughterhouse Cases.'"' There, Justice Miller's opinion for the
Court held that the privileges and immunities protected by the
fourteenth amendment were only those that were already protecta-
ble federal rights. This had the effect of rejecting the argument that
the Bill of Rights was part of the privileges and immunities applica-
ble against the states, for Barron had already held to the contrary.
Bingham's confusion over Barron now had its revenge. However, the
opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases did more, for it also restric-
tively interpreted the thirteenth amendment (and implicitly the
Civil Rights Act passed in furtherance of it) as limited to slavery or
racial applications. 7 Indeed, it is probably true that Miller was
crime." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866). It is worth speculating what the result
would have been with respect to the criminal sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
court adopted this test in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) where the conviction
of a sheriff for killing a young Negro, Hall, by unjustifiably beating and crushing his body
was overturned because of failure to require the jury find specific intent to infringe Hall's
constitutional rights in the first trial. On retrial Screws was acquitted. It is very difficult to
see how Screws could have beaten and killed Hall out of a sense of public duty. The require-
ment of finding specific intent to infringe upon a person's civil rights is, however, a difficult
element to prove.
104. Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 Yale L.J. 851, 871-72
(1943) [hereinafter cited as Graham].
105. Id. at 871.
106. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
107. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
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"convinced that statesmanship would be best served during Recon-
struction by interpretations which upheld the legislature's capacity
to govern and which at the same time restricted the discretionary
powers of the courts."'08 This view underemphasized the extreme
position argued in dissent, particularly by Justice Field. Justice
Field's dissent (as well as Justice Bradley's, albeit to a somewhat
lesser extent) was the precurser to the development of the doctrine
of substantive due process-the curtailment by the courts of the
power of the legislatures to regulate entire areas of law. Justice
Holmes suggested that the doctrine was based upon the mistaken
assumption that Spencer's Social Statics had been enacted into the
constitution and that it was the special duty of the Supreme Court
to assure its implementation.0 9 Justice Field confused the issues of
availability of rights and scope of rights. He argued that the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, as well
as the thirteenth amendment, and its subsidiary legislation, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, prohibited the grant of the monopoly over
slaughtering in this case, since "all monopolies in any known trade
or manufacture are an invasion of these privileges, for they encroach
upon the liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue happi-
ness, and were held void at common law . ... "110 Later he wrote,
quoting from the Case of Monopolies, which had held that a grant
of a monopoly in playing cards in England was invalid:
[AInd it was adjudged that the [grant of the monopoly] . . . was
against the common law, because it was against the liberty of the
subject; for every subject, by the law, has freedom and liberty to
put his cloth to be dressed by what clothworker he pleases, and
cannot be restrained to certain persons, for that in effect would be
a monopoly, and, therefore, such ordinance. . . would be void."'
Field's argument here would later blossom into the theory of sub-
stantive due process which recognizes a worker's unfettered right to
sell his labor to his employer for as little money and as many hours
per day as he pleases. Only Justice Bradley, in dissent, takes the
further step of discussing whether the monopoly grant was a "rea-
sonable regulation.""' 2
However, the Court's refusal to accept these arguments is not
surprising, for they appeared incapable of limitation. In addition,
108. Graham, supra note 104, at 873.
109. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 75 (1905).
110. 83 U.S. at 101-102.
111. Id. at 103, quoting from COKE's REPORTS, PART H, at 86 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 119.
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the Court recognized the tremendous potential for expansion of ju-
dicial power. Nevertheless, the dissenters were correct when they
maintained that the Court's reading of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause made it, "a vain and idle enactment, which accom-
plished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the
people on its passage." "3 However, this is partly Justice Field's fault
because his assertion of the absolute nature of the right led the
Court to deny the plaintiffs any rights at all. The result was a
situation in which all rights under the statute and constitutional
amendments were denied these white plaintiffs and apparently all
white plaintiffs, although the only proper issue was whether this
particular right existed.
DEVELOPING FEDERAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE JUSTIFICATION
If the 1866 Civil Rights Act is read in a way that would emphasize
its close connection with the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, radical alterations in various areas of private
law are possible."' Santa Fe in McDonald asserted its ability to
adopt virtually any policy it desired, so long as there was no viola-
tion of the explicit terms of applicable federal or state statutes.
Section 1981 is, however, far from explicit. The Supreme Court not
only rejected Santa Fe's position, but leaped to the opposite conclu-
sion, namely, that the difference in treatment was impermissible on
the facts as presented." ' The following is an attempt to suggest the
113. Id. at 96. One of the ironies of the situation is that the United States' first "red
scare," the Paris Commune of 1870, may be responsible for both the curtailment of the rights
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the rise of substantive due process. Graham makes
quite a credible case that the immediacy of the coverage by telegraph of the events of the
commune, the first major international incident reported in the United States by telegraph,
played an important role in Justice Field's movement towards laissez faire doctrinarism.
Justice Field was unwilling to accept the verdict of the court in the Slaughterhouse case, and
because of the effect of the elimination of appeals from habeas cases to the full court, was
able to write his version of what the law should be on the Ninth Circuit over which he presided
as Circuit Justice. See Graham, supra note 104, at 884. The result was "Chinese aliens on
the Pacific coast had rights superior to American citizens in Louisiana. The Chinese were
secure in their constitutional rights to work in a quicksilver mine; yet New Orleans butchers
were not similarly free to pursue their hallowed calling. A California mining corporation
might hire and fire as it pleased, despite legislation to the contrary; yet a midwestern railroad
or New York insurance company was required to submit to ceaseless legislative exactions."
Id. at 887. Compare How Ah Know v. Noonen, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) where Justice
Field invalidated the queue ordinance requiring that Chinese incarcerated in county jails in
San Francisco have their hair cut within an inch of their scalp, with the decision in Kelley v.
Johnson, 96 S. Ct. 1440 (1976), a contrary result with respect to police officers. To the
traditional Chinese, a queue or pigtail was a symbol of manhood.
114. See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (the contract to purchase a beer from
a private bar was protected under § 1981).
115. At one point Justice Marshall speaks of the "illogic in retaining guilty employees of
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sort of analysis that the court should engage in when interpreting §
1981 contractural rightse 116
To simplify analysis, the more difficult cases have been excluded
from consideration, particularly such cases as failures to promote
existing employees. The presumption is that the Civil Rights Act
entitles people to equal treatment, unless there is an articulable
justification for different treatment; but the requirement of articu-
lated justification increases as one moves from the sphere of private
entities conferring benefits, such as gifts, upon particular persons,
to the sphere of what a layman might describe as the imposition of
penalties upon particular persons. In essence, this has some of the
characteristics of the distinction in the public sector between rights
and privileges as far as public goods are concerned. While the dis-
tinction in the public area has largely been discarded, the concept
may yet serve a useful purpose in the non-public area. Moreover,
there are justifications that are impermissible, not because they are
irrational, but because they conflict with important federal policies.
Let us focus upon the two separate types of cases that may arise
in the context of employment practices."7 Succinctly, these are ei-
ther failure to hire, or failure to fire. The cases are either failure to
confer a benefit (the hiring decision), or failure to impose a detri-
ment (firing decision). Although at first blush, there seems to be no
reason for treating the cases differently, this is not the case.
If there is a failure to confer a benefit (i.e., failure to hire a white
when a black is hired, assuming absolute equal ability), there is
clear element of injustice on the surface. As a societal judgment, the
result may be proper because blacks have, as a group, suffered dep-
rivation. Even though in particular cases the black may not have
specially suffered deprivation (or we cannot demonstrate specific
one color while discharging those of another," and further on rejects a defense of the union
suggesting that sometimes a compromise settlement might result in bargaining off an em-
ployee in return for retention of others. 96 S. Ct. at 2580. Only if one infers that the suggestion
of racial discrimination presumptively invalidates all different treatment, is a complete shift
from total employer discretion (as advanced by Santa Fe) to total impermissibility appropri-
ate. 96 S. Ct. at 2580 n.14. Since it appears unlikely, despite Justice Douglas's opinion in
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), that such a simplistic solution ought to or will in
fact be obtained, a search for more explicit justification seems appropriate. Santa Fe, for
example, noted in its brief to the Supreme Court that Laird was a supervisory employee, and
suggested that the same offense by such employees was less tolerable. Brief for Sante Fe at
8-16, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
116. See Justice White's dissenting opinion in Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2604
(1976). He raises arguments which suggest that § 1981 simply disabled states from according
different treatment to executory contracts. The full Court has, however, rejected these argu-
ments.
117. The analysis with respect to similar issues such as admission to law school or medical
school and the expulsion from either entity would be similar.
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causal links between individual deprivation and rewards conferred
by society), the resulting preference is arguably tolerable or "spe-
cially just," at least for some transition period. The cost of such
preference is measured by three primary factors: (1) injustice per-
ceived by society as a whole; (2) injustice perceived from the black's
perspective (i.e., "It isn't worth much if Whitey gives it to me; or if
it is valuable, I am not really entitled to it"); (3) the injustice to the
white competitors who were not hired.
However, to the extent that the assumption about equal abilities
holds true, factors (2) or (3) should disappear. If the black is as
qualified as the white, his achievement (being hired) is as valuable
as it would be for the white."8 For a white who was not hired, the
argument differs but the conclusion remains the same. The white
was not entitled to be hired ahead of the black,"9 so that his com-
plaint is not well founded. An external observer would say that
failure to hire him does not impose a special disadvantage, it simply
refuses to confer a benefit that he is not entitled to receive. In
addition, the white applicant is frequently in a position of being one
person in a pool of applicants. With reasonably high unemployment
the legitimately perceived injury would be spread among various
white applicants. Concededly, part of the reason each did not get
the job is that a black did, but just as important is that fact that
even if the black did not get this particular job, not every white
would be hired.""
The paradigm situation shifts, however, in the case of failure to
fire a black who is equally entitled to be fired with the whites. The
two factors previously discussed are logically present and serious.
First, the black's potential perception of his achievement as less
worthy need not rest upon general statements or beliefs about the
state of society. He knows that personal shortcomings would have
cost him his job. Society would agree that his self-perception ought
to be lowered. Indeed, the result of special treatment is likely to
encourage similar activity by both the individual and others who
see the determination by the employer as a "rule" that should con-
118. Of course perceptions become important here, as well as the general accuracy of the
major hypothesis. If less qualified blacks are frequently hired, admitted to schools, etc., then
even if equal ability obtains in the particular cases, perceived inferiority is likely to result.
See Slate, Preferential Relief in Employment Discrimination Cases, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 315, 321-
30 (1974).
119. The custom has been that he was so entitled.
120. This was the case in the DeFunis problem. Not only were there applicants who had
higher grade point averages and LSAT scores than DeFunis but also applicants whose pre-
dicted first year averages excelled his. D. GINGER, DEFuNIs V. ODEGAARD AND THE UNIVERSITY
OF WASHINGTON 107 (1974).
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trol future cases. Society should not encourage such rules. In the
McDonald' case, the result would be to encourage theft by those
minority group members who believe they could not be fired.
Second, from the viewpoint of the fired whites, their loss or detri-
ment is particularized. No other whites compete for the privilege of
being fired. The employer has implicitly told them that an offense
has been committed serious enough to cause their termination, but
not serious enough to terminate blacks in a similar situation. Either
of three classes of offenses are possible. Offenses which result in
termination; offenses which never result in termination; and an
intermediate class. Presumably the latter is involved here (i.e., the
theft was not so serious that all had to be fired). The whites have
been terminated because they are culpable, but a black who is
equally culpable is retained. The whites' complaint of unjust treat-
ment is correct. Here, the employer asserts that an offense is serious
and not serious. 2 In these situations, when the employer has the
power to fire the black, will society permit the employer the liberty
to retain him?
There is, moreover, precedent for this sort of analysis, precedent
for the assertion that justifications in the law are rational but unac-
ceptable. For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 3 a case which
dealt with state requirements of minimum periods of residency for
purposes of eligibility for welfare payments, there was clearly a very
rational and compelling state interest involved. The states wanted
to curtail immigration into the state for the purpose of collecting
welfare benefits and in so doing, save state money. This "purpose
of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justifica-
tion for the classification created by the one-year waiting period,
since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible."'2 The na-
tional policy in favor of free movement of persons made that partic-
ular rational justification an unacceptable one. In a similar fashion,
one might say that the national policy against theft in conjunction
with the right of all persons to equai treatment, makes the particu-
lar action of the McDonald employer impermissible, whatever the
reason.
121. In addition this same contradictory message goes out to all other current employees,
for such a determination is highly visible by comparison with a refusal to hire, a routine event
in the employment office of a large firm.
122. See notes 118 through 120 and accompanying text supra.
123. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
124. Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
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SALES OF HOUSES: THE EASY CASE
An expanded interpretation of § 1981, implying a federal right to
equal contracting for all potential private plaintiffs against discrim-
inatory treatment, could have significant application in the area of
purchasing and selling real estate. All private justifications for dif-
ferent treatment of either sellers or buyers would become subject to
federal court scrutiny. No private justification for unequal treat-
ment would be permissible if that justification contravenes federal
statutory or constitutional policy. The courts have the duty of deter-
mining which federal policies would "qualify" for such treatment
and whether they had been contravened in a particular case.
For example, the simple purchase of a house normally involves a
sequence of contracts with private parties; first by the buyer with
the seller, then with one or more banks, an appraiser, a title insur-
ance company and others. With respect to certain of these contrac-
tural relationships, there is clear federal statutory authority prohib-
iting discrimination. 115 However, if the appraiser underappraises
because of fear of the changing character of the neighborhood, and
the bank lowers the amount it will lend as a result, it is far from
clear that this activity reaches the level of proscribed discrimina-
tion. 26 The existence of a private right to sue outside of § 1981 is
even less clear. Moreover, the determination of damages poses seri-
ous problems even if discrimination can be proved.
It is worthwhile in this context to examine the holding of the
Contract Buyers Cases."7 The court held that sellers of homes to
blacks who take advantage of black buyers by charging exorbitant
prices on real estate are liable for such excess profit. The measure
of damages is the difference between "normal profit" and the total
profit made on such sales. The cases developed from challenges to
the blockbusting tactics of real estate brokers in the City of Chi-
cago. 128
In Chicago, there has been a twofold phenomena taking place
with respect to housing. First, whites have fled to the suburbs; and
125. See The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970).
126. But see the suit filed by the Department of Justice against, inter alia, the Society of
Real Estate Appraisers for this kind of practice. N.Y. Times, April 17, 1976, at 1, col. 5. The
1866 Civil Rights Act was not a basis for this suit. United States v. American Institute of
Real Estate Appraisers, 76 C 1448 (N.D. Ill., filed April 16, 1976).
127. Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
See also Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974).
128. Chicago, it might be noted, is one of the most segregated cities in the North, both in
terms of housing and its concomitant, schools. See GREENSTONE & PETERSON, RACE AND Au-
THORITY IN URBAN POLrrics 19-24 (1974) [hereinafter cited as GREENSTONE]; DYE, THE POLITICS
OF EQUALITY 71 (1971).
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second, the cost of housing in white areas within the city has risen
dramatically. This results in an inner city "gold coast" and peri-
pheral white suburbs. Of course, the inner city gold coast is inte-
grated to the extent that the high housing costs are within the reach
of upper strata blacks. But the practical effects of minimum black
political participation,'29 coupled with school deterioration,"30 fear of
crime, and other urban ills, has escalated the value of suburban real
estate. So far as both the white ring and the inner city gold coast
areas are concerned, some part of the price rise could, at least in
theory, be traced to the factor of discrimination. 3'
If whites have standing under § 1981, and a white buyer has paid
some part of the price of a house as a premium for living in a
segregated area, he should be entitled to sue the seller and the
banking groups that together concentrated loans for home pur-
chases in certain areas. Conversely, a white seller in a changing area
could sue the appraisers and banks whose underevaluation of the
neighborhood effectively reduced his sale price. The person who
could not purchase at an inflated price would have a good cause of
action against the brokers who engage in block busting and racial
steering, as well as the red lining banks. Many of these suits could
be brought as class actions. Perhaps even elderly homeowners on
fixed incomes would have a good cause of action against the entire
class of persons active in their local real estate market on the theory
that their taxes have disproportionately increased to reflect the
"racially based" increment in local average market prices. It is little
comfort to the elderly that their heirs may benefit from capital value
gains when they can barely afford to live in that highly taxed prop-
erty. 32
In the context of the Contract Buyers Cases, testimony was taken
suggesting that roughly 20 percent of the sales price was excess
profit. It was no defense that the sellers would have charged the
129. See GREENSTONE, supra note 128, at 19-24.
130. At least perceived school deterioration.
131. See Olson, Employment Discrimination Litigation: New Priorities in the Struggles
for Black Equality, 6 HARV. Civ. RiGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 20, 22-23 (1970). There are reported
studies that suggest variously that the cost of being black in terms of wages after controlling
for various factors, such as education, may be measured as "38% of the difference between
the incidence of poverty for whites and negroes . . ." or "[tlo put it boldly, about two-fifths
of the difference in average earnings of whites and non-whites is what it costs to be black";
or "[tihat well over one-third of the income differential between whites and blacks could be
eliminated by ending job discrimination with no expenditure of public funds for adult educa-
tion." Id. See generally Note, The Survival of "Last Hired, First Fired" under Title VII and
Section 1981, 6 Loy. CHi. L.J. 386 (1975).
132. See Note, Redlining-The Fight Against Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 6 Loy.
CHI. L.J. 71, 75-78 (1975).
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same price to white buyers. Similarly, wealthy blacks who can af-
ford to buy in exclusive suburbs might pay the same price as a
wealthy white person. That still does not excuse the artificial price
inflation for all buyers attributable to racism. The Seventh Circuit
stated:
It is no answer that defendants would have exploited whites as well
as blacks. To accept defendants' contention would be tantamount
to perpetuating a subterfuge behind which every slumlord and
exploiter of those banished to the ghetto could hide by a simple
rubric: the same property would have been sold to whites on the
same terms. . . . We find repugnant to the clear language and
spirit of the Civil Rights Act the claim that he who exploits and
preys on the discriminatory hardship of a black man occupies a
more protected status than he who created the hardship in the first
instance. Moreover, defendants' actions prolong and perpetuate a
system of racial residential segregation, defeating the assimilation
of black citizens into full and equal participation in a heretofore
all white society. 33
To paraphrase part of the opinion above, the redliner and exploiter
of those banished to the wealthy white ghetto are not entitled to
hide by a simple rubric. 134 Federal courts should not permit private
contracting with respect to housing which fosters racial discrimina-
tion in the face of the clear federal committment to open housing
for all. Reviving the full import of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and
particularly § 1981 provides a partial answer to this problem.
133. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 331 (7th Cir. 1974).
134. However, a jury returned a verdict for the defendants in one of the contract buyers
cases. Chicago Sun Times, April 17, 1976, at 2, col. 3.
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